This Week on What the Hack: What Is “Going Ghost”?
This Week on What the Hack: What Is “Going Ghost”?
“Why would anyone hack me?” DeleteMe’s Nicholas Olsen built a fake person to prove that being nobody is the point. Also: Glen Sorensen shows how a real nobody’s data can get a company hacked, and shares real solutions.
Episode 278

Ep. 278: “Is It Possible to Disappear Online?”
“What the Hack?” is DeleteMe’s true cybercrime podcast hosted by Beau Friedlander.
Disclaimer: This transcript was auto-generated and may include minor errors.
Beau: Here’s something I hear all the time.
Clips: I don’t have anything worth stealing. My stuff’s probably already out there anyway, so whatever. I’m not a CEO. Why would they bother?
Beau: So that’s true, but it’s also true that a lot of hackers, especially state-sponsored ones, tend to look at banks and governments and billionaires as the targets they really wanna get. They’re not super interested in an everyday person like Tyson Brooks. In the eyes of a Lamborghini-collecting threat actor, they do like their Lamborghinis, Tyson is about as nobody as it gets. He’s a data typist. He picks up shifts at Chick-fil-A on the side and like a lot of people, sure, he has a LinkedIn account and maybe an Instagram. He’s findable online. And yeah, like a lot of us, Tyson has also been hacked. Tyson exists to show why exposure is dangerous. Tyson isn’t real. He was invented by the person you just heard talking about him. He’s a crash test dummy for your personal data. Totally cool. Watching what happens to him turns the I am nobody argument on its head, which is the whole point of what Nicholas has been doing with him. We’ll talk about that later, because to an attacker, being nobody is kind of the point.
Nicholas: Tyson is not a high-ranking individual in his company. He’s not anyone massively important,
Beau: Big hacks don’t usually start with some super genius, zero-day exploit or smart hacker, I mean, they do. They happen that way, but most of the time they happen because somebody was a little sloppy, somebody was gettable. It comes through a person.
Clips: A massive data breach affecting Verizon customers. The personal information of six million customers has been leaked online. A cybersecurity firm uncovered the issue. Now they blame it on human error.
Beau: And they don’t need much from that person. It’s all online.
Nicholas: I don’t care if I know one piece of information about you. I care if I know everything about who you are before I ever even speak to you.
Beau: Your phone number, your birth date. You don’t even need your date of birth. The password you’ve been using since college.
Nicholas: When I sound like you, I could look like you, I could be you,
Beau: what can a total stranger dig up about you in a single afternoon? Let me count the ways. How does a person like Tyson, but a real one, open the door to an extinction-level event for an enterprise? And can you actually disappear? I mean, can regular people make themselves hard enough to find that the bad guys just move on. Because once an attacker has enough on you, all they need is timing and a little, you know, rizz or some game.
Glen: If you can assume enough of that trust in just a fleeting moment, that can be enough.
Beau: I’m Beau Friedlander, and this is “What The Hack?” The podcast that asks, in a world where your data is everywhere, how do you stay safe online?
Intro
Beau: So if the problem is that you’re like most of us, and you’re relatively easy to find, the fix is to make that not the case. Shut down everything you do online. That’s it. Delete everything. Throw your phone in a river or a lake, wherever you live, and move to a cabin or tent. Not super practical. But here’s the thing about the people who do the kind of digging we’re talking about for a living, both the attackers and the people who make it their business to stop the attackers. They’re really good at knowing how not to exist online, at least with the personae that they use to do what they do. They even have a name for what we’re talking about here. It’s called going ghost. And since they can do it, we’re gonna try and learn about going ghost today. It’s a program at DeleteMe that I learned about, which I thought, I think is super cool, that is aimed at teaching people what the problem set is so they can kind of solve it.
Glen: you’re never going to function in society and get to, like, zero presence on the internet. But you can reduce what’s useful to attackers against you.
Beau: That’s Glenn Sorensen. He’s a solutions engineer at DeleteMe, and he spent his career keeping hackers out of places where they don’t belong. These days, he takes a talk called Going Ghost to companies, mostly to people whose job it is to protect them, and Glenn’s version of Going Ghost isn’t a cabin in the woods. For those of you who know me, I don’t mean that cabin, and I’m not getting into it. Anyway, for Glenn, the goal isn’t to vanish. It’s to make yourself not worth the trouble. You know, not sure. Move on. Glenn has a playbook for that, and we’ll get to it later, but first we need to understand who we’re hiding from, and the best way to do that is to watch someone get found step by step, piece by piece, the way an attacker would actually do it. So that’s where Tyson comes in.
Nicholas: Before I was ever an OSINT researcher or even working in cyber, I was originally a cyber educator. I taught K through 12 students the foundations of cyber, what that meant, how to protect themselves online, digital and online safety, all of those things.
Beau: That’s Nicholas Olsen, the OSINT person extraordinaire at DeleteMe. He can find anything. If it’s online, he’ll figure it out. For our listeners who don’t know what OSINT is, open-source intelligence, walk us through the fundamentals.
Nicholas: It is essentially being a very good Googler. So finding information that’s available on open sources, places where I can access without ever having to pay for anything, or even with data that I do have to pay for, if it’s on the internet and it’s available, I can find it.
Beau: Now you did something that I actually suggested when I started at DeleteMe, and I think it’s a great idea. You created a fake person for training, so tell me about that.
Nicholas: When I created this person, he was originally started with the idea of how do we teach kids in a fun, enjoyable way how to digitally protect themselves, or what attackers look for when they are attacking somebody with an online footprint. And so this is where this persona started, and it’s morphed into so much more kind of as time has gone on.
Beau: So you created this person whose name I know, whose name is like Rockwell Dinosaur Breath. What’s his name?
Nicholas: His name is Tyson Brooks.
Beau: Tyson Brooks, before you joined DeleteMe
Nicholas: Ya, it was a few years before I joined DeleteMe. Tyson Brooks was chosen from a website called Fake Name Generator, where essentially you can generate entire personas. And so I typed in the criteria that I wanted, which was I wanted an American man, ’cause that tends to be the majority of sock puppets, at least that I see.
Beau: What is a sock puppet?
Nicholas: A sock puppet is a fake persona made primarily for digital intelligence investigations. So when you wanna look at someone and someone’s social media without ever exposing your true identity, you utilize a sock puppet.
Beau: So a sock puppet is just a non-entity that looks like an entity that you’re using to do research?
Nicholas: That is correct. Yeah. And a majority of the time, this is how attackers also utilize social media. They don’t want their real name associated with profiles that they use to compromise high individual accounts. So they’ll end up stalking your social medias using a fake person or a fake persona in some capacity
Beau: Yeah. All right. So, Rockwell Dinosaur Breath was born, and all the kids loved him because his name was funny. And, no, Tyson Brooks was generated by a third party and, was there a reason why you did it that way? Did you just not wanna have any fingerprints on it?
Nicholas: Not necessarily. It wasn’t my intention to ever have Tyson be something that was used for investigations. A big part of it was I wanted to show kids, especially those who were more interested in cyber, right? How do I make a sock puppet? This is the foundational kind of concept for those who are much more technically advanced and who wanted to learn that specific skill. He was a good way to demo that as well, right? So I set him up the same way I would set up a regular sock puppet account, which is, you know, using fake name generator, getting some sort of profile picture, making him look a little more real by editing his face in Photoshop and doing things like that. But the difference between him and a lot of sock puppets that I’ve traditionally created is he has a larger online footprint that is intentionally exposed. So a lot of the times you can leave digital breadcrumbs so people think you’re real, right? If you make all your posts on the same day, people are gonna assume that, oh, well, this doesn’t look real, right? Who makes 15 posts in one day that all have, like, douche text? Usually there’s a photo, maybe they update their profile picture, something changes. And so with Tyson, he was a much longer project than I normally take on my sock puppet accounts because I wanted him to feel like an authentic human being.
Beau: So Nick, now you talk about sock puppets and you’re teaching children grade six through whatever, older, old enough to cause trouble, how to create a sock puppet. And you’ve already said sock puppets are used by criminals. You don’t see a problem there?
Nicholas: I think the stigma around cyber is very hush-hush with a lot of different topics, right? Pen testing particularly, OSINT particularly, because there
Beau: pen testing, if you’re not familiar with the term, means penetration testing. It’s a term used to say like, “Nick wants to get into your system. Let’s see if he can do it.”
Nicholas: Yep, exactly. And so for when I was young, that was generally how I got into cyber, right? I was causing a lot of havoc because I didn’t have people to kind of guide me in the right direction. When you frame it in a way where the students are given the opportunity to actually social engineer someone and get that out of their system before they attack the school network and say, “Wow, your phishing email was really good. You should try and come work as an intern for my cyber firm.” That happened a lot when I was a teacher. And so the stigma behind we shouldn’t educate or we shouldn’t teach these students things because they can do bad things is the same reason I did bad things when I was young
Beau: Well, there’s a whole criminality to What The Hack. Anybody who’s listened to the show for a long time knows that we’ve warned over and over and over again, we are not teaching you how to do crimes.
Nicholas: Correct. Yeah.
Beau: Okay. Now we’ve got Tyson Brooks Rockwell Dinosaur Breath, and he is, a living, according to the internet, not breathing entity who looks real. And So he’s a sock puppet who’s also a straw person.
Transition to DeleteMe
Beau: You’re creating a very believe person, And then you left this job, and that persona, did you keep it up, or did you just let it sit there and…
Nicholas: Well, I generally let it sit there, but all of the accounts were still active. Usually with sock puppets especially, fake accounts, they get banned pretty quickly on social media accounts. So think Instagram, Facebook, they get taken offline pretty fast. With Tyson, he ended up staying on for as long as we were utilizing the account semi-frequently. He was a real person and who had real accounts. And so I ended up leaving that job. I came to DeleteMe as an OSINT researcher, and I had a few marketing folks come to me and say, “Well, how can we teach people about what attackers do, how they think, and why what we do is important?” And Tyson immediately came to my mind ’cause he’s the perfect case study for all of that.
Beau: Now, what you don’t know about DeleteMe is it’s a little bit like working at Fort Knox We have valuable information which we need in order to do what we do, which is to remove people’s information from data broker sites and other data-related entities. When I started at DeleteMe, I had to sign all kinds of things saying that I would not disclose information that I saw. I was going to be seeing information that was sensitive. I understood that. I would go to the mat and protect it at all costs, right? So did you. When we train and we are showing people around the system I think it’s pretty cool that we train on Tyson Brooks. He is the first thing you see if you become an employee at DeleteMe and you’re being walked through the system. Isn’t that right?
Nicholas: That’s correct.
Beau: It’s not dangerous.
Nicholas: It’s a totally safe environment. And Tyson doesn’t have some of the more realistic examples, right? Tyson isn’t on data broker sites in some capacities, not at least publicly, but it gives us enough data to where we can show the average everyday employee, “Here’s why what we do matters, and here’s the exposure you actually have.”
Beau: How do we know that he’s not on data broker sites? How come he’s not on data broker sites?
Nicholas: ‘Cause he hasn’t bought anything. He’s not a real person that has a real identity quite yet. He doesn’t do things that compromise his identity in such a way. And it’s something that we’ve continually tested on, and it’s something that I’m continually testing on just in my free time here. It’s something really interesting is I also believe in deleting your data, you poison your data, right?
Beau: Talk about that. Data poisoning is… like, my birthday, I was born in the 1910s according to the internet.
Nicholas: Exactly. And so removal is one step, right? We talk about removal with Tyson because it’s that low-hanging fruit, getting rid of the ability to find those really easy wins. But if on top of those easy wins, things that are maybe a little more confidential, right? Things such as data broker websites that are behind a paywall. If somebody pays $2 for your record and all they get is bad information, they wasted their money on trying to find you. And so it’s a mix of both things, right? With Tyson, he’s propagating his information elsewhere on the internet and showing that he’s a social media person and seeing if we can compromise him in any capacity, right? But also Tyson is not the prime target for these people because they know he isn’t real, right? He’s not buying things with a credit card in his name. He doesn’t have a driver’s license. He hasn’t gotten things done that are major. And so it’s both ends of the same coin,
Beau: Well, that’s fine because we’re not using him for that. We have Tyson because we don’t wanna show employees live data, and we have Tyson because we wanna educate, now adults, people in cyber, not children who are interested in cyber, about the perils of data brokers and cybersecurity. So it’s not perfect, but it’s actually ideal for the kind of education we’re doing. I mean, so it sounds like Tyson Brooks is actually a crash dummy.
Crash dummy
Nicholas: The crash dummy analogy is really good, right? The dead, super dead, broken wrist. That’s almost exactly why we take the route that we do, right? With showing this type of data in a controlled environment. Imagine we had to do this every time with a real individual, right? We tried
Beau: They be getting hacked.
Nicholas: They’d be getting hacked constantly, right? Their email would be getting breached pretty frequently. It’s things that I’m sure we could find someone who would be willing enough, and albeit crazy enough to do that. Tyson exists to show why exposure is dangerous with the expectation that his, I guess, crash dummy is super dead every time. That’s what we want. We wanna show the ultimate critical outcome of why attackers do what they do, because that is the end goal for a majority of folks, is it’s not the broken wrist, right? I don’t care if I know one piece of information about you. I care if I know everything about who you are before I ever even speak to you. That’s what I as an attacker care about, and that’s my thought process going into why Tyson.
Beau: This crash dummy is a great thing to have so that you can show the dangers and the perils out there. What is the real danger when it comes to having the kinds of data that we remove out there? Like, why should anyone really care? ‘Cause, you know, that’s the pushback in cyber is that, you know, of course your phone number and your email address and your other stuff is out there. Like, so what?
Nicholas: And this was the central point of thinking of someone like Tyson, right? Is with the identity that was created, so many people especially think any conference, right? Black Hat, RSA, DEF CON, people come up and say, “Well, why me?” ’cause the majority of them understand our product, but public data is a real thing, right? You can search up my property on any sort of like
Beau: But the answer is why not?
Nicholas: The answer is why not? Exactly. And so that’s what Tyson has set out to prove. Tyson is not a high-ranking individual in his company. Tyson is a data typist who works at like a Chick-fil-A on the side. He’s not anyone massively important, but when you continually email him and you get him to click on a phishing link, and all of a sudden I see that he’s emailing his boss from his personal email address, that then creates that entry point for me as an attacker to say, “Well, based on knowing him, based on finding his password, knowing his name, knowing maybe an email address, knowing that phone number,” all of those things can lead back to your identity in more ways than dished brokers. And so the idea isn’t to make you undoxxable, right? It’s not why me? It’s going to be you, and removing as many of those easily accessible data points about yourself, finding those pieces of information that you can easily remove off the internet and clear a majority of your data, that’s gonna deter 99% of all attackers. Then you can start asking, “Well, why me?” Because if they said, you are on DeleteMe, you’re completely removed, a lot of your information is off of data broker sites, you’re being very proactive with your privacy, someone had to spend a lot of time to do that type of attack to you. They had to spend a lot of time, effort, and energy researching you and finding that information. And so at that point, that’s when the question why me becomes very, very valid, right? Because the effort is so much higher, and then that’s something that’s a much higher concern.
Beau: Well, the bigger thing for me too, Nick, is this, you know, if you’ve seen the “Mission Impossible” movies with all the masks, you know the masks they pull off? You know, those masks are super important to penetration, right? I look just like a person who works here. So now Tyson makes a lot more sense, even if he’s got a job that pays $25 an hour or 20 or whatever. It doesn’t matter. He walks in, and the guy who owns the company goes, “Hey, Tyson.” And Tyson goes, “Hey, what’s up, Dave?” Or whatever the boss’s name is. And that does mean that Tyson has access to things that actually matter
Nicholas: Exactly. And the barrier to entry for that has become so much lower, right? When I look at somebody like Tyson who has all this exposure, now instead of ever walking through your front door, I call your help IT person sounding like Tyson, and if they say, “Well, what’s the email address that you have associated with your account?” I can tell them. They say, “What’s maybe a previous password that you used?” I can tell them.
Beau: you can authenticate
Nicholas: on. Exactly. I can authenticate, and when I sound like you, I could look like you, I could be you, all three of those things allow me to walk in the front door and be you without any authentication.
Beau: Tyson Brooks was born to teach children how to protect themselves online. Then he morphed into a crash test dummy, a training tool really, so new employees can learn about how to use the system without ever having to touch a real customer’s data. We’re a privacy company. But his crash test days are far from over. Coming up, what happens when we take Tyson out into the world and hand him to groups of people? We’ll find out how much a stranger can piece together about one ordinary guy, and how a data typist can worm their way into an entire company. Then what you can actually do about it and whether going ghost really makes the bad guys move on.
C Break
Beau: Glenn Sorensen has been taking Going Ghost on the road. It’s a live privacy and security session where people learn all the things that an attacker can learn about them, and then what they can do about it. Glenn Sorensen, welcome back to What The Hack.
Glen: Thank you. It’s great to be here. Good to be with you again.
Beau: For those of you who don’t know. Glenn is a, sometime… Were you ever a white hat hacker?
Glen: Only in the lightest sense of the term. I assisted a little bit, but I, you know, most of my pen testing was, on the OSINT side or the lightest of hacking, I guess, so
Beau: And were you ever a person who tried to stop hackers?
Glen: Always in some form or another.
Beau: Well, then you know that, there’s kind of a cognitive dissonance problem in cybersecurity.
Glen: don’t say
Beau: Yeah. I mean, in case you don’t know or in case you’re from Germany, that was sarcasm. So yeah, I mean, why such a sarcastic response? How bad is it?
Glen: I think there’s a lot of disconnect out there between, ideal realities and practical realities, and I mean, the practical realities of organizations and what they face. There are so many risks, so many vulnerabilities now in AI flavors, that we can’t cover them all. So you have to prioritize. Like, what’s important? What’s most important? What’s likely to burn me today versus tomorrow or next week? And how much of that is tech, and how much of that is people and process? And I think some of the dissonance there is, the tech versus people and process.
What is Going Ghost?
Beau: So going ghost It reminds me of, you know, I don’t know, a thriller, some sort of spy thriller. If you ever go to DEF CON or Black Hat or any of the hacker conventions, you’ll see a lot of ghosts. What does going ghost mean to a cyber person?
Glen: Going ghost really means, limiting your ability to be found out there. Your definition of found out there, I think, depends on who’s looking and what you’re doing. But from that hacker standpoint, like that’s often what you’re thinking about if you’re talking, you know, going ghost.
Beau: So the hacker is thinking about going ghost, but we’re telling civilians to go ghost. Are we asking them to become hackers or are we asking them to hack the system that hackers use to hack?
Glen: We’re not asking them to become hackers. I think it’s more about awareness and about how we’re leaking information out there, all the time, how tech is built to collect that information, how systems, are built by companies to collect information about us, on us, really without our consent or without our knowledge in a lot of cases. It’s starting with understanding that and then starting to do some of the things that make sense for you. So it’s not really about disappearing or, you know, wiping your presence completely off the internet. It’s about reducing the volume of information out there. It’s about starting to take back your privacy and thinking about that from your organization’s standpoint. Because if all of this information is out there about all of our employees, so again, CISO hat on, if this information is trivially available about all of my employees, well, that becomes a vulnerability for my organization. That becomes a risk that I need to manage. And maybe I haven’t managed that human attack
Beau: No, you definitely haven’t. I mean, not maybe. You almost definitely certainly have not unless you’ve sat down with all of your employees for, I don’t know what, two weeks, 40-hour weeks, and done, removals from all of these different places. So what we’re trying to do, it sounds like, is to go from an environment where there’s reliable signals about who’s who to less reliable signals about who’s who.
Glen: Exactly. you’re Never going to function in society and get to, like, zero presence on the internet. But you can reduce what’s useful to attackers against you. And when we’re talking going ghost, there’s really, like, four Ds in this. There’s discover the things about yourself that are out there. Deny the easy doors. Disguise stuff going forward so that you’re not necessarily giving out your real information where it’s not warranted, and then deleting what you can out there. And obviously, the last part is where DeleteMe really comes in. There’s more to it than just one thing. There’s no silver bullet. And we want to reduce what we put out there in addition to deleting what we can out there. And it’s not about getting to a zero presence or no presence. It’s about making the economics for the attacker not work for them, or work less at the very least
Beau: There’s no silver bullet, you said. And I’ve heard that said a lot in cyber. But there are orange hunting safety vests and hats and scarfs. And by doing visible things to disrupt the signal that hackers rely on in a very visible way You are not gonna get, if you’re in the woods, I mean, the example is obviously the hunter seeing the orange isn’t going to point their firearm in that direction. Why? You know, that is a signal that says, “Don’t shoot.” And by the same token, if a hacker sees that there’s data that has been compromised by deletion, by removals, by data poisoning, by people being aware of what’s out there and playing with it, they’re gonna move on. Now, here’s the part that I think is super interesting. Going Ghost is a tour to campuses, right? And you talk with these companies, maybe they’ve already done some security training. They send fake phishing emails, all that. So what’s the difference when the employees have actually gone out and cleaned up some of their own data?
Glen: They, there is less out there about them. They have done something to manage that human attack surface. But I think we’ve seen how effective and/or how ineffective that can be too. So we’re talking about leading this ahead of an attack. So it’s less about spotting the attack at that point and maybe stopping the attack or reducing the quality to a degree where then it becomes easy to spot or easier to spot.
Beau: Well, but also just making it like hackers, like am I going after the Bell Jar campus or am I going after the Brick Bat campus? I’m gonna go after the Bell Jar campus because Brick Bat has a pretty good cyber program, and hackers do know that. Unless there’s a flag they really wanna capture
Glen: Yeah, I think that’s fair. But it still changes the calculus in that. If there is simply less information available about company A versus company B, you’re maybe gonna target company B if the reward is similar.
Beau: 100%. I mean, we can’t all seduce the CEO of Nvidia
Glen: No, nope, not this time, I guess
Beau: But, you know, I guess the
Glen: Put on my charms and yeah.
Beau: It, but you know, why bother? Why go through all that effort and like have to deal with maybe him, he maybe has bad breath. Who knows what the problem is? But like, you don’t have to find out because you can just hack a mid-level employee and then work your way into the system. Camp out there for months and months. Talk about that. Talk about the typical motion of a hacker. Do they just like get in and like dive bomb the thing they’re going for? Or is it a slow process?
Glen: Depends on the threat actor group, but the ones that are going to be more successful are going to do so with care and more deliberately. I mean, again, with information available, they’re gonna come armed with as much as they can, about your people, about your systems, and they’re not necessarily gonna go or even be able to go straight for their goal in one swoop.
Beau: They’re gonna hang out. They’re gonna make sure the coast is clear. They’ve broken into the building and now they’re gonna look normal for a second
Glen: Or let AI assist them, I guess
Beau: Look normal. Regardless, they’re gonna
Glen: Look normal
Beau: but they’re going to be, “Quick, look normal.” It’s never worked for me. But you are going to hang out. Like, you’re not just gonna go in and, like, grab the CEO’s credentials. You’re going to go and find your way through that environment and then gain access incrementally, right?
Glen: Yeah. In a lot of cases, if you look at Scattered Spider, for example, and how they operate, they use that social engineering, that initial entry point through people. And once they get in, they’re adding privileges to compromised accounts. They’re finding ways to gain the privileges they need to do the things that they want to achieve their goals. That’s not an instantaneous thing. They come with as much research as they can, but they’re only gonna know the outside until they get inside, right?
Why is Going Ghost different?
Beau: Why is Going Ghost different? What are you guys doing?
Glen: We’re starting to teach people how to treat their own privacy like an organizational problem. How to, one, remove what’s out there, but slow the leakage in what is being put out there. If we look at the ways our information is collected and harvested and bought and sold these days it’s our mobile apps on our phones. It’s our smart TVs. It’s our sensors in all of the things that we drive and ride in. And it’s all looking to harvest information about me and about us and put it out there ostensibly for targeted advertising, but obviously that turns into a lot of other things, right? And when this proliferation of information out there is then trivially useful by an attacker to hit my organization, all right, I wanna protect that, right?
Beau: trivially useful?
Glen: I mean, you search on a search engine with a name and a few terms, or you go to a data broker site, a people search site, and you can enter a person’s name and the approximate city that they live in and find all of their core PII. Well, that ties you into social media profiles. It ties you into data breaches and breach dumps. It ties you into a whole pile of information in which you can quickly build a dossier on an individual or a set of
Beau: the trivia?
Glen: target. Yeah.
Beau: that you’re talking about?
Glen: It becomes we’ll say much more trivial. But to find that core, if that core PII is trivial to find, that’s the tie to everything else.
Tyson’s Back
Beau: And so why are CISOs not concerned about it as much as you would think? Or are you, when you do this, when you do these talks, are you speaking mainly to CISOs or are you speaking mainly to employees who don’t have a firm grasp on the problem?
Glen: I’m often talking to security practitioners or maybe those in charge of executive protection. And I think all these folks understand that there’s a problem out there, that privacy is a problem. I don’t necessarily think they’ve connected it to an organizational risk, like something that really can be a vector in and lead to that proverbial boom. And I think one of the things I’ve had folks tell me about it is they’ve never seen this information presented this way. And we walk through what gathering this information looks like. We walk through a persona where we grab these bits and pieces of data and put them together, and you put it all in one place. And I mean, you have the basis for an attack right there we do this through a persona that we’ve created. Our friend Nicholson has helped quite a bit in the creation of Tyson Brooks. And Tyson is our fellow that has an online presence like you might expect. He’s got a LinkedIn profile. He’s got a website with some information. And we show how it’s the data brokers that tie that into the stuff that he’s put out there consciously. It’s the unconscious stuff that’s put out there about us that ties into the conscious stuff that’s out there, which then also ties into data breaches and breach dumps which contain information and usernames and passwords, for example, from past data breaches, and how we can use that to get into Tyson’s organization ultimately
Beau: Okay. How does it start? Walk me through it
Glen: Well, you can start with a company that you wanna target, right? You go to some of the B2B side data brokers, and you’ll find information about the company and its tech stack and the people in it. So if you start focusing on the people in it, and you move over to LinkedIn, for example, you’ll find their profiles there. You start to gather the information that they just have available on their profile. So you can usually find at least a name, approximate city that they’re living in, some basics around their professional life that you can then use to confirm them on the people search sites which you pivot to next. So you find that core PII I was talking about. You find their phone numbers and their email addresses and their physical addresses, and you start to use that in conjunction with… Now there’s data breaches, and I can tie an email, for example, to this person, Tyson, in our case, and his username and password combinations that have gone out in past breaches. And if he’s used the same password, for example, or the same, we’ll say flavor of password creation, well, you can get into his email that way.
Beau: is rad, Tyson is the best, Tyson is great, exclamation
Glen: yeah. Tyson1234,
Beau: that’s what you mean by flavor. So people aren’t daisy chaining, but they’re doing it close enough that AI can figure it out quick.
Glen: Yeah.
Beau: Gotcha.
Glen: and once you can get into his email, for example, that’s often the keys to his personal digital kingdom. And if there’s crossover with, personal and professional life, if there’s colleagues that, have interacted with him that way, and this is just one example, but, then we can start to social engineer people inside the company without hacking anything in the company,
Beau: But you can also social engineer Tyson. I mean, if Tyson were real. I mean, if I can get into Tyson’s Gmail account and I’m a criminal, which seems redundant, but let’s just say, though, I’m a serious criminal, and what I’m after is like, you know, there’s people out here right now taking folks hostage, gunpoint, to get access to their crypto wallets because there’s millions of dollars in their crypto wallets. This is not, like, this is not a white-collar crime. These are real criminals who will do really criminal things in order to get where they’re going. And here’s the problem. If they compromise Tyson, the Tysons of the world, through his Gmail account, and let’s just say they get access to his bank account and they drain it. “I’ll give you your money back, Tyson. I just need you to get me access to the CEO in your company.”
Glen: Exactly.
Beau: “I won’t show your mom what kind of websites you go to. You just have to give me access to your COO
Glen: And the bad guy’s imagination is the limit.
Beau: the bad guys are bad guys
Glen: I mean, we’re seeing things like, North Korean IT workers having evolved to threatening people, because they know where they live, in order to do the thing, be the laptop
Beau: Whatever the thing is,
Glen: credentials or, you know, let them use their address or their credentials or, you know, whatever it may be. But the threats are physical
Beau: the threats are physical, the crimes are like that, and I think it just needs to be repeated. The crimes, we’re talking about criminals. We’re not talking about like nerdy little hackers. We’re talking about people who break bones and ruin lives
Glen: Talking about North Korea, we’re talking about cyber criminal gangs, and they want money in most cases, but they want what they want, and they obviously don’t care about you or your wellbeing, or we wouldn’t be here
Beau: No, we would not be here and we wouldn’t have scam compounds, which if you haven’t listened to the episode, we did a series on scam compounds, including an interview with somebody from Uganda who was in the compounds and got out. You should really look into that because it’s all connected, and that is, it’s all connected. This is why RICO suits got invented, because it’s organized crime.
Protecting against?
Beau: So who are you protecting against? And talk about the threat. What are you mainly finding folks are concerned about when you go to these campuses and talk?
Glen: Cyber criminals obviously are the biggest chunk. I think there’s maybe a little bit too much emphasis in people’s minds around, you know, the nation state and the APTs and those threat actors.
Beau: So you have to tell people what an APT is before they lose their minds
Glen: an advanced persistent threat. Those are really the nation state actors
Beau: That was, yeah, that was my fourth grade school teacher. An advanced persistent threat.
Glen: A day in and day out, that was
Beau: No, but you’re talking about North Korean, IT workers and, you know, state-sponsored hackers and,
Glen: The Chinese government, the Russian government, those are the sophisticated ones that have the resources and have the expertise and time and know-how, and they have a particular goal in mind, and they’re probably gonna find their way into your environment if your environment is the target. That’s not necessarily what we’re concerned with, though we can make it harder for them, too. We really wanna go after the cyber criminals. Like, that’s the biggest area of focus here. The more we can make it cost them to attack someone successfully, the more it costs, the less people they can attack, the less companies, the less organizations they can hurt. The harder it is, the more likely they are to move on down to somebody else’s organization rather than target yours. For me, it really becomes about economics and about making it less profitable to be a bad guy.
Beau: Well, the bad guys have a pipeline just like the good guys.
Glen: Yep.
Beau: And so if the pipeline is too much work for the return on the investment, they’re gonna move elsewhere. And I think like, so you’re just trying to create… It sounds to me like it’s not about being perfect, it’s about being perfectly annoying
Glen: Yeah. It’s about being annoying and obnoxious to the attacker out there or the would-be attacker.
Beau: Like, this is not a dataset. They, you know, so that they have their Obi-Wan Kenobi moment that, you know, this is not the dataset you’re looking for
Glen: And they move on down the road. Yep. They find the droid somewhere else
Beau: and can they tell though, Glenn? I mean, if somebody has had a lot of removals done and spent some time trying to dismantle their dossier online can a hacker tell? They can tell that the data is not as reliable?
Glen: I can from my perspective when I’m doing OSINT research on individuals that have taken measures including something like DeleteMe, versus those that haven’t. And it’s an order of magnitude difference in the
Beau: right? Huge
Glen: yeah, in the difficulty for me to put together a dossier on them and be confident in the information that I’m finding out there and that it is the person that I think it is, and this is the house they actually live in, and that I have reliable information
Beau: I always bang on this particular drum because I think it’s what I would do if I were a hacker. And as you know, our CISO, I’m not gonna name him even though it’s probably… isn’t it public information who he is?
Glen: It’s pretty easy to find, but–
Beau: Reuben. Fine, Reuben. Reuben, you know, likes to tell me that I am actually a hacker. And, well, I do host a show called “What The Hack,” so I have some skills. If I were to go to the dark side, I think my motion would always be the same, ’cause it seems like the easiest motion. I think I would go on people search sites and figure out the whole constellation of people who have phone numbers associated with the person I’m targeting, and email addresses. And then I would go on social media to see if there was any correlation there. And then through the social media, I would figure out who was close enough to this person that it warranted my effort to spoof their email and try and start a conversation about something. I think I would always go through the third or fourth remove to get to my target. How common is that? Am I just a person who thinks too much, or is that… Do hackers really do that sort of thing?
Glen: Absolutely they do. Think about it this way. If you’re looking at a particular person, a particular target, how are you going to convince them to do what you want them to do that’s maybe against what they actually want and is in their best interests, right? You gotta trick them somehow. How are you gonna trick them? You trick them through the people around them. You trick them through their family. You trick them through, you know, piggybacking on some trust that already exists with those people around them or with those associates or colleagues. Familiarity. Yeah. Absolutely
Beau: what do you do with it? I mean, so like, hey, but are we talking about like, “I’m stuck in Des Moines, send me 1,000 bucks”? I mean, I know we are, but how does that work on the corporate level?
Glen: Well, here I’m locked out of my account and I’m on the road. Can you help me? Can you ask IT to reset my password? Can you insert, whatever thing of the day that you may need to come up with? If you can assume the identity, the trust of an individual and get someone else to act on your behalf in the corporate setting, that is, “Hey, can you just, you know, text this number my email address or my…” Yeah, I don’t know, whatever information you’re looking to get, right?
Beau: Yeah. You know, it’s like the same as if, we can talk about DeleteMe ’cause we both work at DeleteMe, and I know, and we are trained within an inch of our being sane, on how to protect the data that we’re trusted with, right? But it would be like if I called you up and my voice… Let’s just do the anatomy of this hack. My voice is available through the podcast. You could do this analog with me because I’ve had so many hours of voice taped, right? So you could actually create a recording where I’m saying in an analog, just in editing, no AI, no sampling, “Hey, Glenn. Dude, just do me a solid.”
Glen: It’s often just that one next hurdle that they need to get a human to cough up. And I mean, I can tell you, like, I’ve been in this field for a long time. I am pretty skeptical of a lot of things. But if you catch me in the right frame of mind with the right voice, yours, asking for something that is, yeah, okay, it’s maybe not that out of line.
Beau: So it is just about using the ecosystem out there in order to create a facsimile of the ecosystem and then strike
Glen: Piggybacking on the trust. If you can assume enough of that trust in just a fleeting moment, that can be enough.
TFS
Beau: Okay, it’s time for our tinfoil swan. It’s, that’s our paranoid takeaway to keep you safe on and offline. While I was working on this podcast with Glenn Sorensen, I actually I talk to Glenn every week, and I talk to him every week at a specific time on a specific day. And while we were talking this week, I got a pop-up on my phone asking me if I wanted to go to a place right near where he lives for $200 Weird, right? So I thought first ’cause it came through my ISP that it was from my ISP, and I then thought, “Hmm, it could be Google related since our meeting is on a Google Calendar.” And then I thought maybe it’s Apple. And it turns out it could be all three after I did a little research, and I could be imagining things. It could be that nobody did anything. But let’s just say they did, and let’s just say for saying sake, ’cause I’m not going to name names, but I’m gonna name a name ’cause we need to look at something. So let’s talk about Verizon as the ISP. I’m not saying that’s my ISP, but it’s an, an ISP. And why am I being cagey about ISP? Because if someone knows your ISP, they can SIM swap you, which is where they steal your phone number, and that can lead to them stealing all your money. Now, for Verizon, to make yourself as hard to hit as possible or hard to target with ads, go to privacy preferences under your account, opt out of custom experience plus. Sounds good, right? But don’t do it. Get out. And anything with personalized marketing programs, like, get rid of them. That’s part of what’s happening. With Google, you need to go to Google My Ad Center and sign in with the Google account you use and turn off personalized ads. It’s as simple as that. And then with Apple, is there anything you can do on an Apple? Yeah, only if you’re using the apps, and if you do, you can just not allow apps to track and follow what you’re doing. I know it doesn’t sound like much, but it’s better than nothing. And, listen, if you like “What The Hack” and you are a regular listener and you think other people would benefit from listening and you think, why, what… All right, you know where I’m going. Tell them to listen to the show. Tell them to rate and review. If you have not rated and reviewed the podcast where you listen, do it. It helps people find the show. That’s it for this week. Stay safe. We’ll see you next week. And, yeah, thanks for listening.
Learn More:
- Learn more about Going Ghost and how to protect your workforce.
- Schedule a demo of DeleteMe for your organization.
- Find out how to remove your personal information from the internet
Save 10% on any individual and
family privacy plan
with code: BLOG10
Our privacy advisors:
- Continuously find and remove your sensitive data online
- Stop companies from selling your data – all year long
- Have removed 35M+ records
of personal data from the web
news?
Exclusive Listener Offer
What The Hack brings you the stories and insights about digital privacy. DeleteMe is our premium privacy service that removes you from more than 750 data brokers like Whitepages, Spokeo, BeenVerified, plus many more.
As a WTH listener, get an exclusive 20% off any plan with code: WTH.



